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Abstract: How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant
intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the
same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based
on the other’s intended generosity. Participants successively face three game types, the ultimatum,
yes-no and impunity game, or (between subjects) in the reverse order. Although only the impunity
game appeals to intrinsic generosity, we confirm conditioning even when sanctioning is possible.
Based on our data, we distinguish two major types of participants in all three games: one yielding to
the weakest social influence and the other immune to it and offering much less. This is particularly
interesting in the impunity game where other-regarding concerns are minimal.
Keywords: (conditional) generosity; ultimatum game; yes-no game; impunity game; experiments
1. Introduction
Generosity is an important aspect of human social interaction usually attributed to intrinsic
motivation like impure or warm glow altruism (see e.g., Andreoni [1,2]). However generosity can
be affected by social and strategic influence (e.g., via conformity seeking, reputation formation,
etc. see Vesterlund [3] for a survey). Our aim is to shed new light on how others’ intentions can affect
one’s own generosity when wanting to help.
To this end, we run an experiment in which participants are matched in pairs of allocator
candidates who both state their generosity intention although only one is randomly selected as
actual allocator and solely responsible for a needy participant. Before knowing the own actual role,
each participant states her independent generosity intention and can adjust it via conditioning on
information that the other’s generosity intention is larger or smaller. Will one allocator candidate
condition her offer on an anonymous other’s intention when this is purely counterfactual, since not
being implemented? It is this very weak social influence on which we focus.
In order to assess how others’ behavior can affect one’s own generosity, we experimentally
implement a sequence of three successive games: first, the ultimatum game, second, the yes-no game,
and third, the impunity game, or (between subjects) in the reverse order. All three games involve
a proposer making an offer and a responder accepting or rejecting it.1 Changing the game type does not
question the basic innovation of our design, namely conditioning on the counterfactual offer intention
of somebody with whom one surely will not interact. So all three game types are embedded in the
1 Due to the strategy vector method (see Selten [4]), each participant determines independent and conditional offers in the
role of proposer as well as an acceptance threshold in the role of responder.
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same conditioning framework but differ in how generosity intentions and behavior may be affected
by strategic concerns: hardly at all in case of impunity, quite a bit in yes-no games with veto power
but without monitoring the offer and finally in ultimatum bargaining granting both, veto power and
monitoring. The advantage of studying such closely related games with increasing strategic influence
of responders is to test whether and how weakest social influence varies when strategic considerations
become more important.
By allowing to condition only on purely counterfactual and therefore outcome-irrelevant
intentions of others, we study the, in our view, weakest social influence and we confirm that
such influence of others on own generosity intentions is surprisingly strong. This suggests
a context-dependency of individual choices which is usually overlooked by data on actual outcomes,
specifically those who fail to record the effect of purely counterfactual intentions of others,
learned through communication devices. Such social effects cannot be detected and tested via
sequential or recursive donation experiments admitting sanctioning, reciprocity, peer pressure,
conformity, reputation formation, competition in helping and generosity.
Although the impunity game2 is most suitable for eliciting intrinsic generosity intentions, we also
investigate conditional generosity in case of sanctioning power via ultimatum and yes-no games.
Compared to the impunity game (IG), the yes-no (YN) and the ultimatum game (UG) both grant
sanctioning power to the responder but differ in information when possibly sanctioning:3 the responder
does (not) know the offer in the ultimatum (yes-no) game and can sanction the proposer via refusing the
offer implying zero profit for both. In the impunity game, the responder cannot sanction the proposer
but can still refuse the offer. All three games allow intrinsically motivated allocator candidates
to display generosity and only differ in how offers are confounded by strategic considerations.
Will conditioning in generosity prevail even when disciplined by veto power with or without being able
to monitor the offer? And how do actual offers compare to usual ultimatum (YN or IG game) offers?4
Our experimental setup applies to many field situations where help can only be provided by
one individual only. If somebody suddenly becomes needy, e.g., due to losing a job, a sudden health
problem, etc., only someone nearby may learn about such an emergency and being able to help.
Thus, in the jargon of the literature on bystander effects in prosocial behavior (see Fisher et al. [8] for
a review), we focus on the case of a single bystander. A reason for a single bystander might also be that
victims of bad luck or circumstance often are ashamed and hide their neediness as much as possible
beyond revealing their fate to a single bystander.
Another crucial aspect of our experimental design is that generosity intentions can only be
compared qualitatively. In our view, this appeals to field situations where each potential bystander
would provide specific services and donation which can be compared only qualitatively via “more
or less generous than what I intended to offer”. Specific examples could be that, in case of a job loss,
one bystander offers advice for finding a new job whereas another potential bystander helps out
with money. In case of a health problem, one bystander might accompany the victim to the hospital
whereas another might help out with food and related services. In such situation we often can judge
who helps more, respectively less, however without being able to specify the conditions for both
potential bystanders providing exactly the same help. Our experimental setup captures the qualitative
comparability of generosity intentions by maintaining their numerical measurability.
With regard to reciprocity (e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [9] and Levine [10]), it is not social
dependence per se but the fact that it is triggered by the weakest social influence what we want to
investigate and confirm experimentally by allowing subjects to condition their own offers on intended
2 See, for example, Güth and Huck [5] and Bolton et al. [6].
3 Dictator game experiments—except when especially interested in the “moral wiggle room” (see Dana et al. [7]
—unnecessarily deprive the recipient of voice and choice in addition to excluding sanctioning power, for example,
when comparing them with those of ultimatum game experiments.
4 Note that UG-equilibrium multiplicity is avoided by YN as well as by IG.
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offers of others. Therefore we confirm that generosity is not only dependent on intrinsic or strategic
characteristics. Relating our study to the literature on peer effects (see, for instance, Gächter et al. [11]
and Gächter et al. [12]), the novelty is that we do not condition on the behavior of peers but only on
the counterfactual intention of just one anonymous other.5 Moreover, in our experiment, allocator
candidates receive feedback information only on their own outcomes to discourage conformity seeking
(see Carpenter [13] and Bardsley and Sausgruber [14]).
Our design excludes joint generosity6 since only one of two allocator candidates is randomly
selected to actually help: when helping, help by others is excluded, i.e., our design excludes competition
in generosity. Moreover, our design has its focus on conditional generosity and not on conditional
cooperation7 since we (i) randomly match participants in each interaction, (ii) give them the possibility
to condition on the purely counterfactual generosity intention of an anonymous other and (iii) finally
feature the receiver as a third participant.
The data confirm that the intrinsic generosity concerns of most participants are influenced by
weakest social influence: most of them adjust their offers upwards as well as downwards depending
on another’s intended offer in all three games. Thus intrinsic generosity concerns are cognitively
generated on the spot depending on the game played as well as on those played before. The evidence
of conditional generosity is surprisingly strong, even in the worst-case scenario for conditioning
with the weakest form of social influence, i.e., in IG games. However, significant immunity also
occurs in the form of not reacting to social influence and maintaining one’s own independent offers,
as well as a self-serving tendency in conditioning via larger adjustments downwards than upwards,
i.e., participants react asymmetrically to a larger than a lower counterfactual generosity intention.
Our results question the stability of “social preferences” (see the survey by Cooper and Kagel [18])
which would rule out conditioning on an other’s intended offer which is purely counterfactual and
payoff-irrelevant. Moreover, belief-based other-regarding concerns such as let-down aversion would
have to argue that counterfactual intentions signal what responders expect to be offered.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formally describes the social environment based
on the three game types with the impunity game as the main condition. The experimental protocols
and research questions are described in Section 3. The main findings are reported and statistically
confirmed in Section 4, which is largely devoted to evidence for conditional generosity. Section 5
reports on acceptance rates and payoffs, while Appendix A distinguishes between behavioral patterns.
Appendix B concludes. In Appendix A, the translated version of the Instructions is reported for one
treatment only (since the other treatment differs only in the order in which the games are played).
2. The Social Environment
Participants are matched in pairs of allocator candidates. Each pair consists of one allocator
candidate (e), whose offers ye to the non-endowed responder are even integers ranging from e0
to Pe =e22, and one allocator candidate (o) whose offers yo are odd integers ranging from e1
to Po =e23.8 Being even (respectively odd) is randomly selected by the computer and privately
communicated to participants before they choose their strategy vector. While not yet knowing whether
they are actually endowed, each candidate i = e, o chooses an intended offer yi and two adjusted offers,
y+i and y
−
i ; the former higher than or equal to, and the latter lower than or equal to the own intended
5 Gächter et al. [12] focus on uni-dimensional influence based on actual donations of two successively donating dictators in
three-person dictator experiments.
6 Joint generosity is explored by running charitable donation experiments in which conditioning is investigated via
providing information about other earlier donations, for example, by distinguishing larger (smaller) earlier donations
(see Bereby-Meyer and Niederle [15]).
7 As in Fischbacher et al. [16] and Fischbacher and Gächter [17].
8 Due to Po = e23 > Pe = e22 the available amount differs between o and e so as to allow both o and e to offer the whole
endowment. Moreover, the fact that paired candidates have different headings (e, respectively, o) avoids the possibility of
equal intentions in sharing.
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offer yi. Which of the two adjusted offers y+i and y
−
i will be actually granted when candidate i
is endowed depends on whether the other candidate j 6= i intends to offer more (yj > yi) or less
(yj < yi). In addition to their offer profiles (yi,y+i ,y
−
i ), allocator candidates i = e, o choose their response
depending on the game type:
1. in IG and UG, each i = e, o sets an acceptance threshold yI
i
(respectively yU
i
) based on the same
integer restrictions for i = e, o; and
2. in YN, each i = e, o decides between unconditional acceptance (δi = 1) and rejection (δi = 0).
Thereafter, each allocator candidate i in a pair is randomly selected with probability 1/2 as
proposer and endowed with either Pe or Po depending on i = e (respectively o). This endowed
proposer (e or o) confronts an opposite (o or e) non-endowed candidate of another pair in the responder
role so that an even (odd) offer is accepted or rejected according to an odd (even) acceptance threshold
in IG and UG. Since intended offers are never equal within a pair of allocator candidates,9 the factual
offer yi of the actual proposer i = e, o is either the downward adjusted offer y−i or the upward adjusted
offer y+i , with j denoting the non-endowed candidate in i’s pair. Participants’ payoffs depend on the
game type as follows:
• in UG, proposer i, with either i = e or i = o, earns Pi − yi, and responder j, with j 6= i, earns yi
when the offer is accepted, that is when yU
j
< yi; both, proposer and responder, earn zero when
the offer is rejected, that is, when yU
j
> yi;
• in YN, proposer i, with either i = e or i = o, earns Pi − yi, and responder j, with j 6= i, earns yi
when the offer is unconditionally accepted, that is, when δj = 1; both proposer and responder
earn zero when the offer is unconditionally rejected, that is, when δj = 0;
• in IG, proposer i, with either i = e or i = o, earns Pi − yi irrespective of the responder’s acceptance
threshold, and responder j, with j 6= i, earns yi when yI
j
< yi and zero otherwise.
Compared to UG and YN, the responder in IG has no material punishment power but rather,
has the power in determining yI and “voice”, which is granted by informing the allocator whether
yi > yI
j
or yi < yI
j
applies.10 The benchmark solutions, based on common monetary opportunism and
(at most) once repeated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, are:
• in IG and UG, responder i sets yI
i
= yU
i
= 0 when i = e and yI
i
= yU
i
= 1 when i = o, while in YN
responder i, with i = e, o, sets δi = 1;
• in each game type, proposer i, with i = e, o, sets y+i = yi and y−i = 0 if i = e and y−i = 1 if i = o;
• finally, anticipating y+i = yi leads to yi = 0 for i = e and yi = 1 for i = o optimal.
For all games the outcome predicts little or no generosity by proposers who rely on the lowest
positive offer (in YN, also the second lowest).11,12 The choice of yi is ambiguous: if not actually
offering, one’s choice of yi is payoff irrelevant. If selected as the actual proposer, one can implement
the optimal offer yi via yi = yi and not adapt, but may also adapt to any final offer yi via y+i and y
−
i by
choosing an extreme offer intention yi (ye = 0 when i = e or yo = 23 when i = o). Anticipating how
one’s own offer intention yi may influence another’s actual offer yj with j 6= i is not captured by the
benchmark prediction due to its assumption of commonly known opportunism in the sense of own
payoff maximization.
9 Although equal intentions are often maintained (see Di Cagno et al. [19]), we opted against eliciting reactions to the equality
of intentions since this questions qualitative comparability.
10 In the terminology of Yamagishi et al. [20] we have implemented a non-private IG.
11 For ye = 0 in YN both acceptance and rejection are best responses, that is, there are two (pure strategy) equilibria.
12 UG has other equilibria with other, also fair, outcomes. These, however, rely on weakly dominated response strategies
which would not survive once repeated elimination.
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If predicting common(ly known) rationality, one would not expect conditioning on another’s
counterfactual intention about which one is only qualitatively informed, nor outcome dependence
on game types as well as on their sequence and learning by playing the same game repeatedly.
When planning the design, on the contrary, we were quite confident that fairness is a social norm
and that therefore generosity maybe affected by the generosity (intention) of an (anonymous) other.
Rather than confirming stable (payoff-based) social preferences, we expected all of the above aspects
to matter. Especially, we hypothesized that
• the overwhelming tendency of participant is conditioning in the sense of y+i > y−i , meaning that
one anticipates to be influenced by another’s intention;
• downward adjustments, yi − y−i , to be on average larger than upward adjustments, y+i − yi, i.e.,
when participants adjust, they do so in a self-serving way;
• a significantly positive minority of participants does not adjust at all either due to y+i = yi = y−i
or by avoiding information about another’s intention via ye = 0, implying that y+i is implemented,
respectively via yo = 23, implying that y−i is implemented.
Whereas these hypotheses were predicted to hold across (sequences of) game types and rounds of
playing the same game, we expected
• a lower frequency of y+i > y−i and, if so, an average decrease of y+i − y−i with sanctioning power
in YN than IG and when it lowest frequency when sanctioning is based on monitoring as in UG;
• persistent heterogeneity of adaptation patterns in case of y+i > y−i , e.g., more y+i = yi > y−i than
y+i > yi = y
−
i , and more so in IG than in YN than in UG;
• a decline of average intended generosity and actual offers across the nine successive rounds of
play which are stronger for IG than for YN than for UG.
Relating our setup and hypotheses to studies allowing for “moral wiggle room”13 and confirming
aversion to appear “unfair” either by seeking for circumstances where own self-servingness is less
transparent, e.g., by avoiding information about others’ neediness, respectively about more generosity
of other donors (Spiekermann and Weiss [21]), or to exploit such circumstances when confronting
them (Dana et al. [7] and Dana et al. [22]). What remains intransparent for the needy recipient in our
setup is how the actual offer came about: is it due to “object norm complying” (Spiekermann and
Weiss [21]) in the form of y−i = yi = y
+
i or ye = 0 and y
+
i , respectively yo = 23 and y
−
i , or to adapting
to another’s intention in case of y+i > y
−
i ? In our setup profiles (yi, y
+
i , y
−
i ) and which of the two offers
y+i or y
−
i in case of y
+
i > y
−
i determined the actual offer remains hidden for recipients. So if proposers
want to justify self-servingness, they can only appeal to the intransparency of how their actual offer
came about. For example, they may argue that their offer intention yi has been more generous but
that another’s lower generosity intention has triggered their meager offer y−i rather than their more
generous offer y+i (≥ yi) .
3. Experimental Protocol
Each subject is confronted with all three game types whose sequences monotonically vary
(between-subjects) in veto power: in treatment T1 with UG→YN→IG veto power is decreasing,
and in treatment T2 with the reverse order, veto power is increasing. Games with the strongest
(respectively with no) sanctioning power of responders, that is, UG (respectively IG) are played first
in order to exclude path dependence or last in order to assess experience effects with the two other
game types. To distinguish spillover effects from experiences with related games from learning when
the same game is played repeatedly, each game type is encountered in three successive rounds before
13 We thank one of our referee for this suggestion.
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switching to another game type, or when reaching the last (ninth) round.14 Only one randomly selected
round of the nine successive rounds is paid (to avoid experimental house-money effects).
In order to guarantee newly formed pairs of allocator candidates in each round of playing
the same game type the software matches two participant pairs, A and B (see Figure 1), whose
members are matched as even-odd (respectively odd-even), and therefore subjected to different integer
restrictions.15 The randomly endowed candidate and actual proposer i, with i = e, o, in one pair
confronts the non-endowed candidate j, with j = o, e and j 6= i, of the other pair as "needy", that is, as
non-endowed responder. So the factual yiA offer by the proposer i in pair A (denoted y
i
A in Figure 1) is
accepted or rejected by the responder j in pair B, and the factual offer yiB by the proposer i in pair B
(denoted yiB in Figure 1) is accepted or rejected by the responder j in pair A. Conditioning is based on
comparing intended offers within a pair (the dashed bi-directed arrows in Figure 1), whereas offers are
made across pairs (the one-direction bold arrows in Figure 1). Obviously this allows for each member
of such a group with four participants to confront a new allocator candidate in the three successive
rounds with the same game type.
	 3	
i=e, o is the downward adjusted offer yi- for yi ˃ yj and the upward adjusted one, yi+, for yi < 
yj, with j as the non-endowed candidate in i’s pair so that i.e. i,j=e,o and i≠j.  
The monetary payoff of the endowed proposer i=e,o is Pi – yi where yi is either   yi+ or  yi-  
depending on how yi and yj are related. The non- endowed proposer candidate j with j=e,o 
and ! ≠ ! receives the yi offer of another pair and earns yi offer  if yi˃	ɏj and zero  otherwise.2 
 
   !-Proposer       !-Responder   
                 
!-Responder       !-Proposer     
 
Figure 1: Random selection whether i or j is endowed and offering in both pairs; 
i,j=e,o with  ! ≠ !. Dash-arrows refer to conditioning while actual offers are 
represented by arrows.  
 
For the sake of more independent group data the matching relies on groups of four 
participants, two e  and two o, split up in two heterogeneous pairs (A and B in Figure 1). By 
randomly selecting the endowed type, i=e,o, of one pair one automatically selects the same 
endowed type, i=e,o, in the other pair. The actual offers y!!  respectively y!! are then accepted 
or rejected by the j non-endowed (???) of pair B, respectively A (see Figure 1). 
 The via z-Tree (Fischbacher,2007) computerized experiment was run at LUISS (Rome) 
with student participants recruited via Orsee (Greiner, 2015). After reading the 
instructions aloud participants could privately ask questions. They then were privately 
																																								 																				
2	Participants	additionally	receive	a	show-up	fee	of	3	euro.	
Pair A 
!!! 	
Pair B 
!!! 	
Figure 1. The matching within and between pairs. Notes: Solid arrows represent the factual offers by
the proposers, while bi-directed arrows represent the conditioning on offers within pair A and pair B.
In each round, participants are privately informed about their current (odd or even) integer
restrictions. Then, their offers (yi, y+i , y
−
i ) in the proposer role and their acceptance behavior (y
I
i
, yU
i
,
or δi) in the responder role are elicited (strategy vector method).16 Finally, participants are informed
about their role (endowed proposer or needy responder) in the current round. Via feedback information,
responders learn the actual offer when accepting it: when rejecting, only their own payoff (zero) is
communicated. Proposers learn about their own payoff and the acceptance or rejection of their offer.
The latter is explicitly disclosed to the proposers in the (non-private) IG, who in UG and YN can
usually (for yi < Pi) infer their offer’s rejection from the 0-payoff. Proposers remain unaware of the
acceptance threshold yU
2
or yI
1
. Both actual players know after playing how much each of them has
earned and in which role (see Table 1).
In total, 144 participants were recruited from a pool of (under)graduate students in Economics,
Law and Political Science at Luiss Guido Carli University in Rome using Orsee (Greiner [24]).
No subject participated in more than one session. Between-subject treatments T1 and T2 used the same
protocol in the reverse order. The software is based on z-Tree (Fischbacher [25]). The experimenter
read aloud the written instructions (see the translated instructions in Appendix A) before subjects
14 All three sharing games were easily understood by participants and three rounds seemed sufficient to indicate learning.
15 Participants were informed about random rematching in each round but not about its specific details.
16 Participants are first asked for an intended offer and then to submit new offers conditional on the possible qualitative
information about the other’s intended offer. We try to limit experimenter demand effects (see Zizzo [23]) for
a comprehensive discussion on the experimenter demand effects) by neutral instructions. Furthermore, the analysis
on differences between adjustments and learning analysis should partially account for it since strategic concerns are likely
to weaken demand effects.
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could privately ask questions and then begin with the experiment. The experiment is compliant with
the laboratory ethical code approved by the ethical board.17
Table 1. Feedback by treatments.
Endowed Proposer Needy Responder
UG game Role and Final payoff Role and Final payoff
YN game Role and Final Payoff Role and Final payoff
IG game Role, Final payoff and Responder’s payoff Role and Final payoff
4. Data Analysis and Empirical Findings
Since participants provide in each of the three rounds of each game type an offer profile and
a response decision whose format depends on the type of game, the data comprises nine successively
elicited strategy vectors of each participant of which, due to feedback information between rounds
only the initial ones are independent.18
We therefore focus our data analysis on controlling interdependence via individual and
group-level error terms. The latter are based on (across nine successive rounds) constantly applied
rematching groups with four participants each, each of whom confront a new partner in all each of
the three rounds within the same game type (see Figure 1), which is then repeated for the later game
type(s). This obviously guarantees independence from group-level data comprising 4× 9-strategy
vectors. Since there are 36 groups our data file contains 4× 9× 36 = 1296 strategy vectors which will
be statistically analyzed either globally or by distinguishing the game type sequence of game types.
Our main findings, especially for conditioning in generosity revealed by offer profiles (y, y−, y+) with
y+ > y−, are analyzed first with descriptive and graphical data analysis of behavioral adjustments,
controlling for statistical significance using Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test (WRST hereafter) for independent
samples and Wilcoxon Signed Rank-Sum test (WSRST hereafter) for matched samples, applied across
all game types or separately for each game type. The choice dynamic is analyzed by tobit estimation;
we control for group effect through multi-level analysis and panel regression. Due to our focus on
conditional generosity, we concentrate on offer profiles, especially when distinguishing behavioral
patterns, and deal with acceptance behavior and its payoff and efficiency implications only marginally.
4.1. Confirming Conditional Offering
Our data show that most participants condition their own offers on another’s purely
counterfactual generosity intention: offer profiles (yi, y+i , y
−
i ) with y
+
i > y
−
i account for 831 out
of 1296 observations (64.12%).19
In Table 2 average offer profiles (y, y+, y−), acceptance behavior (yU , δ, yI), and difference between
independent and adjusted offers (y+ − y and y− y−) for all games, and separately for UG, YN, and IG,
and treatments T1 and T2 are reported.
When all games and both treatments are considered, the average20 upward adjustment y+ − y is
equal to 1.745 (see Table 2, All Games) and reveals that reacting to another’s generosity intention can
considerably increase one’s own sacrifice. Since the average downward adjustment y− y− is equal to
2.883, offer profiles (yi, y+i , y
−
i ) with y
+
i > y
−
i display an average difference y
+ − y− equal to 4.628.
17 Details on the committee as well as the ethical code can be found on the Cesare laboratory web-page (http://
economiaefinanza.luiss.it/en/research/research-centers/cesieg/cesare-centre-experimental-economics/cesare-rent).
18 Thus, guaranteed independence of the initial profiles can only be explored in case of IG and UG as YN is never the game
type played first.
19 Since y+i ≥ yi ≥ y−i offer profiles with y+i < y−i are impossible.
20 In what follows, y+, y− will denote average values.
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Table 2. Average offers y, y+, y−, acceptance behavior yU , δ, yI and differences y+ − y, y− y−.
All Games
y y+ y− y+ − y y− y− WSRST
Obs. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
T1 and T2 1296 7.278 6.595 9.023 7.241 4.395 4.619 1.745 3.042 2.883 5.025 0.000
T1 648 8.373 6.722 10.278 7.294 5.139 4.912 1.904 2.958 3.235 5.317 0.001
T2 648 6.182 6.283 7.769 6.970 3.651 4.180 1.586 3.118 2.531 4.693 0.000
WRST 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ultimatum game (UG)
y y+ y− yU y+ − y y− y− WSRST
Obs. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
T1 and T2 432 8.444 6.224 10.542 6.467 5.597 4.666 3.639 4.391 2.097 3.139 2.847 4.746 0.259
T1 216 10.000 6.173 12.333 6.115 6.824 4.984 4.685 4.912 2.333 2.893 3.176 4.854 0.471
T2 216 6.889 5.889 8.750 6.324 4.370 3.971 2.593 3.512 1.861 3.358 2.519 4.624 0.333
WRST 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.023
yes-no game (YN)
y y+ y− δ(%) y+ − y y− y− WSRST
Obs. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
T1 and T2 432 7.421 6.918 8.958 7.470 4.440 4.854 0.986 0.117 1.537 2.813 2.981 5.261 0.000
T1 216 8.546 6.927 10.352 7.495 5.259 5.051 0.991 0.096 1.806 2.871 3.287 5.414 0.008
T2 216 6.296 6.739 7.565 7.195 3.620 4.514 0.981 0.135 1.269 2.735 2.676 5.097 0.002
WRST 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.412 0.004 0.023
impunity game (IG)
y y+ y− yI y+ − y y− y− WSRST
Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d.
T1 and T2 432 5.968 6.402 7.569 7.449 3.148 3.970 2.315 3.592 1.602 3.138 2.819 5.065 0.000
T1 216 6.574 6.629 8.148 7.599 3.333 4.012 2.454 4.259 1.574 3.069 3.241 5.675 0.006
T2 216 5.361 5.361 6.991 6.991 2.963 2.963 2.176 2.176 1.630 1.630 2.398 2.398 0.011
WRST 0.059 0.146 0.422 0.162 0.844 0.309
Notes: Average treatment effects are compared using Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test (WRST; p-values are reported
for both average proposals and their differences) and Wilcoxon Sign Rank Sum Test (WSRST) to test average
difference distribution.
Result 1. Across all game types nearly two thirds of all offer profiles (yi, y−i , y
+
i ) leave substantial room via
positive y+ − y− for reacting to another’s generosity intention.
Another consistent feature of offer profiles across all game types and treatments is that participants
behave in a self-serving manner, by adjusting more strongly downward than upward. In fact, y−
y− > y+ − y is significant for all game types in both treatments (see Table 2, last column; WSRST,
p-value < 0.001).
Result 2. Most offer profiles allowing for conditioning adjust in a self-serving way, more downward
than upward.
When looking at offer profiles within each game, we confirm that they leave substantial room
for reacting to another’s generosity intentions via positive y+ − y−. Furthermore, the self-serving
behavior in adjusting (y− y− > y+ − y) is confirmed in IG and YN, both across and within treatments
(see Table 2, last column; WSRST, p-value < 0.001; for IG in T2, p-value < 0.05). In UG, on the contrary,
there is no significant difference in average downward and upward adjustments neither across nor
within treatments. This suggests that strategic concerns, which are largest in UG, dampen the reactivity
of conditioning and may question (weak) social influence.
Looking at the average independent and adjusted offers y, y+, y− within game types, we find that
in UG they are higher that those in YN, which are in turn higher than those in IG, and this finding is
consistent with the decreasing sanctioning power of responders. Furthermore, we find no treatment
effect on offers in IG whereas average offers y, y+, y− in UG are lower in treatment T2 than in treatment
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T1 (see Table 2, WRST, p-value< 0.001). Thus, fairness concerns in UG are weaker when played after
the other game types. Similarly, in YN average offers are significantly smaller when the game is
preceded by IG rather than UG (see Table 2, WRST, p-value < 0.001). Figures 2 and A1 (Appendix B)
illustrate the evolution of independent and adjusted offer profiles across the three successive rounds of
the three game types for both treatments. They confirm no treatment effect on offers in IG and that
average offers y, y+ and y− in UG and YN are lower in treatment T2 than in treatment T1. We expected
dominance of conditioning but less reactivity (at least in adjustment size) in case of sanctioning power,
as strategic concerns may question weak social influence. However, due to conditional generosity, in
IG downward and upward adjustments do not significantly differ from those in UG and YN (except
for upward adjustments in UG and treatment T1).
Figure 2. Independent offer and adjustments by treatment. Notes: Average values per period are
indicated by + for y+, • for y, and ◦ for y− while lines represent linear prediction plots along with
a confidence interval (CI 95%).
Looking at the fraction of offers across games in Figure 3, the reaction to the downward adjustment
is more evident in IG (WSRST, p-value < 0.001 in Table 2) but it is relevant in all games. The figure
also reveal that all offer types display a low single peak for YN and IG, whereas for UG this applies
only to downward adjusting offers y−.21 More interestingly, the figure reveals that in IG a large share
(54%) of downward adjusted offer are at the minimum level (either zero or one).
21 This is in line with previous experiments without conditioning (see Güth and Kocher [26], for references).
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Figure 3. Fraction of offers y, y+, y−. Notes: The range of offer profiles is from 0 to 23 to encompass
both odd and even offers. The graph encloses normal density curve for each histogram.
As far as response behavior is concerned, IG responders (with no veto power) state systematically
lower acceptance thresholds (on average 2.315) than UG responders (on average 3.639) who claim
nearly twice as much in treatment T1 (see Table 2, 4.685 respect to 2.593, WRST, p-value < 0.001).
Whereas there is no treatment effect on response behavior in IG: acceptance thresholds in treatment
T1 (2.454) and treatment T2 (2.176) do not significantly differ (see Table 2, WRST, p-value > 0.1).22
The acceptance share in YN is close to 100%, in line with earlier YN-experiments (see Güth and
Kocher [26]).
These results show that conditioning in IG is a stable inclination which emerges even with the
weakest social influence, but also that conditioning is game dependent. The latter justifies our more
systematic attempt to assess conditioning not only in case of impunity but also when sanctioning
is possible. Nevertheless, most participants, overall allow themselves to be influenced by whether
another’s intent to help more (respectively less). In our view, this suggests that (intrinsic) generosity
concerns are usually cognitively generated on the spot, depending on the game type presently played
as well as on treatment, i.e., on the game that is played before.
Result 3. The treatment effect is game dependent:
22 Whether y ≥ yU or y ≥ yI holds allows to verify participants’ consistency, in that they would not otherwise accept their
own offer. Such consistency is higher in UG (71% of adjusted offers satisfy y+, y− ≥ yU) than in IG (43% of adjusted offers
satisfy y+, y− ≥ yI ).
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(i) for IG differences in offers and acceptance thresholds when played first or last are minor and mostly
insignificant;
(ii) for UG average offers and acceptance thresholds are much and significantly smaller when UG is played last;
and
(iii) for YN it does not matter for response behavior whether it is preceded by UG or IG but average offers are
significantly smaller when YN is preceded by IG rather than by UG.
The regression analysis of the dynamics of offer profiles across rounds is presented in
Tables 3 and 4. The analysis is based on twelve normalized offer levels ni, n+i , n
−
i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 11.
23,24
Looking at the three games separately, Table 3 shows that in IG being a proposer in the previous
round (L.proposer)25 has a positive effect on offers in the next round, implying that one is willing
to offer more when having been endowed before, whereas this is not significant in UG. Past profits
(L.Profit)26 have a negative effect on offers in IG and YN: one becomes greedier after having earned
more. Checking whether being an odd or even allocator candidate has an impact on offers reveals that
when odd, there are more downward adjustments toward the minimum level, which for odd is still
positive (and therefore seemingly more tolerable).27
In Table 4 we perform a similar tobit estimation controlling for being a successful proposer in the
previous round (L.Success×L.Proposer).28 The significance of this variable in UG shows that being
a proposer has a positive effect on offers in the following round, only when one’s proposal has been
previously accepted, whereas when proposals were rejected, offers in the following round are lower.
Round variable accounts for the effect of the last period and it is never significant.
Table 3. Choice dynamic by Game (1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
UG YN IG UG YN IG UG YN IG
n n+ n−
L.Proposer 0.61 1.38 * 4.97 *** 0.40 1.47 * 6.21 *** 0.52 1.36 ** 4.48 ***
(0.40) (0.79) (1.41) (0.41) (0.85) (1.49) (0.33) (0.67) (1.31)
L.Profit −0.02 −0.13 ** −0.30 *** −0.04 −0.15 ** −0.39 *** −0.04 * −0.14 *** −0.30 ***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Round 0.16 −0.09 −0.36 0.25 −0.15 −0.30 0.25 −0.38 −0.15
(0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.21) (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.32)
Odd −0.12 0.01 −0.94 0.12 −0.27 −1.34 ** −1.03 *** −0.39 −1.14 **
(0.41) (0.54) (0.61) (0.38) (0.55) (0.63) (0.31) (0.43) (0.50)
Treatment −2.07 *** −2.00 ** −0.89 −2.10 *** −2.01 ** −0.76 −1.61 *** −1.35 ** −0.18
(0.49) (0.80) (0.81) (0.51) (0.81) (0.87) (0.37) (0.62) (0.60)
Cons 6.23 *** 6.08 *** 4.88 *** 7.40 *** 7.58 *** 5.95 *** 4.53 *** 4.52 *** 1.91
(1.05) (1.51) (1.44) (1.02) (1.55) (1.47) (0.84) (1.31) (1.29)
Notes: * indicates pvalue<.1, ** pvalue<.05, *** pvalue<.01.
23 The offers are rescaled via ni =
yi−1
2 when i = o and ni =
yi
2 when i = e. In this way, each offer is associated with a value
between 1 and 11, consistent with the choices ranging either from 0 to 22 or from 1 to 23.
24 We estimated all models with panel data regression. The analysis is consistent when we consider the twelve possible
allocations or the full offer profiles for even and odd participants; nevertheless the censored regression model was more
accurate for the current analysis. We ran also a multilevel analysis to account for different groups: the likelihood ratio test
(testing for the multilevel model) rejects the between-group variations. Finally, we check for sessions effects: the multilevel
analysis rejects between-session variation for YN and IG, while is weakly significant for UG: when wee pool results, we reject
sessions variations.
25 L.Proposer is a variable equal to 1 for those participants who are actual proposer in the previous round.
26 L.Profit is a variable which measure profits earned in the previous round.
27 Odd is a variable equal to 1 for the o−participants and equal to zero otherwise.
28 L.Success is a variable equal to 1 if the offer is accepted in the previous round, both for proposer and responder, and 0
otherwise. Note that L.Success is equal to 0 for proposer in IG when the offer had been refused in the previous round even
though this does not have an effect on the proposer’s payoffs.
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Table 3. Cont.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
UG YN IG UG YN IG UG YN IG
n n+ n−
σ cons 3.27 *** 4.79 *** 4.77 *** 3.29 *** 4.90 *** 5.14 *** 2.56 *** 3.67 *** 3.60 ***
(0.20) (0.31) (0.35) (0.17) (0.29) (0.32) (0.15) (0.29) (0.31)
N 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288
LL −708.49 −652.48 −608.18 −736.86 −698.38 −666.38 −611.11 −529.90 −466.66
pseudo R2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04
F 4.41 2.65 4.89 4.50 2.68 6.43 6.66 3.93 5.65
Notes: Tobit estimation with robust errors (clustered on individuals) censored at the lowest value (0).
The dependent variable is the twelve normalized offer levels ni , n+i , n
−
i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 11. ni =
yi−1
2 when i = o
and ni =
yi
2 when i = e n
+
i =
y+i −1
2 when i = o and ni =
y+i
2 when i = e ni =
y−i −1
2 when i = o and ni =
y−i
2
when i = e Covariates included in the regression are the lagged profit and role, the “odd” dummy to specify
whether the participant is asked to set an odd rather than an even offer, and the treatment. “Round” variable
refers to the three periods of each phase, but due to the lagged period analysis, the variable accounts for
the effect of period 3. We finally control for session (see Table A1 in Appendix B): session-dummies are not
relevant and do not question the significant effects reported here.
Table 4. Choice dynamic by Game (2).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UG IG UG IG UG IG
n n+ n−
L.Proposer −1.29 * 4.57 ** −1.74 ** 5.60 ** −1.33 ** 2.85
(0.75) (2.20) (0.72) (2.39) (0.58) (1.84)
L.success −0.81 1.03 −0.54 1.51 −1.02 * 0.80
(0.70) (0.95) (0.75) (1.05) (0.57) (0.75)
L.success×L.Prop 2.95 *** 0.51 3.43 *** 0.75 2.82 *** 1.65
(0.92) (1.54) (0.87) (1.70) (0.71) (1.22)
L.Profit −0.07 −0.30 *** −0.12 *** −0.38 *** −0.08 ** −0.27 ***
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08)
Round 0.17 −0.32 0.26 −0.24 0.25 −0.08
(0.27) (0.29) (0.22) (0.28) (0.26) (0.34)
Treatment −2.08 *** −0.76 −2.12 *** −0.56 −1.62 *** −0.04
(0.48) (0.82) (0.49) (0.87) (0.35) (0.59)
Odd −0.19 −0.79 0.03 −1.12 * −1.11 *** −0.96 *
(0.41) (0.60) (0.37) (0.62) (0.30) (0.49)
Cons 7.13 *** 3.86 ** 8.34 *** 4.46 *** 5.49 *** 0.89
(1.08) (1.65) (1.04) (1.61) (0.86) (1.45)
σ cons 3.21 *** 4.74 *** 3.20 *** 5.06 *** 2.48 *** 3.52 ***
(0.20) (0.36) (0.17) (0.32) (0.15) (0.30)
N 288 288 288 288 288 288
LL −708.49 −608.18 −736.86 −666.38 −611.11 −466.66
pseudo R2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05
F 4.46 4.78 5.63 6.72 7.97 6.62
Notes: Tobit estimation with robust errors (clustered on individuals) censored at the lowest value (0).
The dependent variable is the twelve normalized offer levels ni , n+i , n
−
i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 11. ni =
yi−1
2 when i = o
and ni =
yi
2 when i = e n
+
i =
y+i −1
2 when i = o and ni =
y+i
2 when i = e ni =
y−i −1
2 when i = o and ni =
y−i
2
when i = e Covariates included in the regression are the lagged profit, the lagged role and success (as well as
their interaction), "odd" dummy to specify whether the participant is asked to set an odd rather than an even
offer, and the treatment. "Round" variable refers to the three periods of each phase, but due to the lagged
period analysis, the variable accounts for the effect of period 3. We finally control for session (see Table A2 in
Appendix B): session-dummies are not relevant and do not question the significant effects reported here.
* indicates pvalue<.1, ** pvalue<.05, *** pvalue<.01.
4.2. Efficiency Analysis
We assess the average acceptance rate across games and the associated efficiency: in IG the
only efficiency loss is associated to rejected offers, while in YN and UG the whole endowment Pi,
with i = e, o, is lost when the offer is rejected. Table 5 lists the average payoff by acceptance rate in
the three game types (‘Total’ refers to both accepted and rejected offers). There is less acceptance
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in IG (36%) than in UG (29%) and in UG than in YN (1.4%). Although the rejection rate in IG is
higher, its average payoff is higher (21.128) as its proposers are not harmed by rejection. Nevertheless,
when considering the average proposer payoff in case of acceptance, proposers earn more in IG than
in UG (17.478 versus 13.66, WRST, p-value < 0.001) and, non-significantly, in YN (17.478 versus 16.95,
WRST, p-value > 0.3), while responder payoffs are higher when accepting in UG (8.77 versus 5.21 in
IG and 5.5 in YN, WRST, p-value < 0.001.).
To analyze efficiency independently of random role selection, we simulated the payoffs for all
possible pairs of factual offers and acceptance threshold yU (respectively yI) of the corresponding
responder (Table 6).29,30 The simulated average results—relying only on the first round with
independent individual choices—include all possible pair matchings of participants and provide
a robustness check of our efficiency analysis. The simulated plays confirm (see Table 6) that the
rejection rate is higher in IG (44%) than in UG (25%);31 proposer payoffs in the case of acceptance are
higher in IG (16.8) than in UG (12.0); whereas responder payoffs are higher in UG (10.5) than in IG (5.7)
(WRST, p-value < 0.001 in both cases).
Table 5. Payoff analysis by acceptance rate (actual plays).
Proposer Payoff (UG) Responder Payoff (UG)
Freq. % Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Rejected deals 126 29.167 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Accepted deals 306 70.833 13.660 5.149 8.771 5.091
Total 432 100 9.676 7.581 6.213 5.856
Proposer Payoff (YN) Responder Payoff (YN)
Freq. % Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Rejected deals 6 1.389 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Accepted deals 426 98.611 16.958 5.218 5.521 5.195
Total 432 100 16.722 5.550 5.444 5.199
Proposer Payoff (IG) Responder Payoff (IG)
Freq. % Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Rejected deals 156 36.111 21.128 2.054 0.000 0.000
Accepted deals 276 63.889 17.478 5.071 5.210 4.867
Total 432 100 18.796 4.581 3.329 4.624
Notes: Payoff average, standard deviations by offers acceptance.
29 We rely on N = 72 participants for UG and N = 72 participants for IG. A participant is paired with half ( N2 ) of the other
allocator candidates, namely those of the other type (o and e) which determines the adjusted offers of this participant.
Each of them is paired with the remaining other allocator candidates ( N2 − 1) which determines the acceptance threshold of
responders. In total, this yields 1,260 combinations for each individual in the first round.
30 Recall that randomly selecting a proposer candidate in one pair also selects the proposer candidate of the other pair since
each interacting pair involves an e−and an o−player.
31 Since YN is never played first, there is no simulation for this game type.
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Table 6. Payoff analysis by acceptance rate (simulated data).
Proposer Payoff (UG) Responder Payoff (UG)
Freq. % Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Rejected deals 22528 24.832 0 . 0 .
Accepted deals 68192 75.168 12.024 4.680 10.531 4.592
Total 90720 100 9.038 6.592 7.916 6.046
Proposer Payoff (IG) Responder Payoff (IG)
Freq. % Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Rejected deals 39725 43.789 21.292 1.584 0 .
Accepted deals 50995 56.211 16.815 4.601 5.675 4.609
Total 90720 100 18.775 4.235 3.190 4.457
Notes: Payoff average, standard deviations by offers acceptance (simulated results).
4.3. Categorization of Offer Profiles and Individual Types
Our data confirm the dominance of other-regarding concerns but also reveal considerable
heterogeneity. In our setting, heterogeneity in conditioning can be assessed via individual offer
profiles by distinguishing the following mutually exclusive patterns:
- Reactive (R): if y+ − y > 0 and y− y− > 0, one adjusts upward as well as downward.
Reactive offer profiles can be further differentiated via:
- Reactive selfserving (Rs): y+− y < y− y−, that is, one reacts more strongly downward than upward;
- Reactive non-selfserving (Rns): if y+ − y ≥ y − y−, that is, one abstains from conditioning in
a self-serving manner.
A participant who is non-reactive may still adjust the intended offer, however only in one direction.
We distinguish:
- Adapting Downward (D): if y− y− > y+ − y = 0; and
- Adapting Upward (U): if y− y− = 0 < y+ − y.
Finally, the immunity pattern (I) means to not adapt at all:
- Immune (I): if y− = y = y+.
Figures 4 and 5 visualize how the shares of these different categories of participants evolve across
the nine rounds for treatments T1 and T2. In IG, as expected, the immunity share is larger than in the
other games, both in treatment T1 (46% in the last round) and T2 (50% in the last round). Furthermore,
the immunity share is rather stable in IG (reacting and adapting pattern together account for at most
only 50%). In UG, on the other hand, the immunity share is larger in T2 (42% in its third round) than
in T1 (19% in the last round). Overall, conditioning survives the repeated play of different game types,
irrespective of their sequence.
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Figure 4. Distribution of types by period in treatment T1. Notes: Each cell entry report the share
of choices based on the individual offer profile types: Reactive non-selfserving (Rns), Reactive
selfserving (Rs), Adapting Downward (D), Adapting Upward (U), and Immune (I) in Treatment 1.
Figure 5. Distribution of types by period in treatment T2. Notes: Each cell entry report the share
of choices based on the individual offer profile types: Reactive non-selfserving (Rns), Reactive
selfserving (Rs), Adapting Downward (D), Adapting Upward (U), and Immune (I) in Treatment 2.
On the individual level, we distinguish participants who are consistently either of the I- or
R-type in all three rounds of a given game type. Always I-participants are 43 in IG (129 observations)
respectively, 39 in YN (117 observations), and 24 in UG (72 observations) whereas always R-participants
are 19 (57 observations) in IG, 22 in YN (66 observations), and 16 (48 observations) in UG (see Table 7).
As expected, the average I-type offer is particularly low in IG (0.899) and increases when the game
becomes more strategic, in the sense of possible sanctioning and (not) monitoring the offer in (YN,
3.103) UG (4.639). Reactive participants have a similar frequency in IG and UG; moreover, their initial
offers are similar in the two game types (respectively 10.263 and 10.604). However, average offers are
adjusted more in IG than in UG, both upward and downward.
Games 2018, 9, 22 16 of 24
Table 7. Immune and reacting participants average offers and acceptance behavior.
Ultimatum Game
Obs. y y+ y− yG
Always Immune 72 4.639 4.639 4.639 2.000
Always Reacting 48 10.604 14.271 6.938 4.979
WRST 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Yes-No Game
Obs. y y+ y− δ(%)
Always Immune 117 3.103 3.103 3.103 1.000
Always Reacting 66 10.212 13.606 6.455 0.955
WRST 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020
Impunity Game
Obs. y y+ y− yI
Always Immune 129 0.899 0.899 0.899 1.039
Always Reacting 57 10.263 15.281 5.526 3.947
WRST 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The two groups are consistently adopting the same strategy in all three periods of UG, YN and IG,
respectively. Average offers between groups are compared using the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test (p-values are
reported for both average proposals and their differences).
5. Conclusions
Our data confirm conditional generosity: most participants condition their own offers based
on another’s purely counterfactual generosity intention in all three different game types we have
considered. This even holds for the weakest social influence setup with no room for reciprocity (like in
impunity games) and no competition in helping (since only one of the two allocator candidates will be
the actual proposer) . The evidence is revealed by positive offer differences y+− y, y− y− and y+− y−
across all three games and both sequence treatments and is surprisingly strong: participants are
influenced by whether another intends to help more (respectively less). Note that this predominance of
conditioning questions that stating one’s generosity intention yi is not behaviorally irrelevant. Strategic
manipulations via offer intentions are possible and likely successful.32 We also found that conditioning
is game and treatment dependent and survives the weakest social influence (in particular it survives
even in the last round of the impunity game, in both sequences). In particular, participants in IG
and YN adjust more downwards than upwards while strategic concerns in UG provide larger and
symmetric adjustments.
Most importantly, participants, who are socially influenced, display greater fairness concerns by
offering considerably more than the participants immune to social influence.
Altogether, our results confirm the intuition that (intrinsic) generosity is more often than not
prone to social influence, even if very weak. Our results suggest that social preferences are not given
and stable but have to be generated in a context dependent way, where context can include rumors
about others’ intentions, even if only qualitatively comparable, but also incorporate strategic aspects,
such as sanctioning and monitoring of offers. Hopefully our data can help in understanding how
one’s own (intrinsic or also strategic) generosity intentions are possibly questioned and adjusted when
32 If, for instance, an o-allocator candidate does not want to offer more than necessary, e.g. in case of impunity, but would
like to trigger more generosity by the e-allocator candidate, o might strategically choose yo = 23 and y−o = 1. Thus, the
robust evidence of conditioning allows to manipulate the other’s actual generosity by guaranteeing ye = y−e when allocator
candidate e (and not o) is actually endowed. For e-allocator candidates, the corresponding behavior, namely ye = 22 and
y−e = 0, would be very costly: if e is actually endowed and confronts an allocator candidate o choosing yo = 23, the actual
offer of e would be ye = y2 = 22.
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learning about another’s intentions, either only qualitatively (as in our setup and likely in the field) or
quantitatively. In spite of the field relevance of our experimental setup to clearly confirm such results
required some rather special aspect like ruling out competition in helping the needy and endowing
only one allocator candidate. Avoiding such aspects would enrich the social context what could trigger
confounding effects which we wanted to avoid. In this sense our setup is admittedly stylized.
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Appendix A.
Translated instruction for treatment T2.
Instructions to Participants
Introduction
Welcome to our experiment! During this experiment, you as well as the other participants will
have to take several decisions. Please read the instructions carefully. Your decisions, as well as
the decisions of the other participants will determine your payoff according to rules, which will be
explained shortly. The earnings during the experiment are expressed in euros (e). In addition
to the earnings obtained over the course of the experiment, you will receive a show-up fee of
e3.00. Please note that hereafter any form of communication between the participants is strictly
prohibited. If you violate this rule, you will be excluded from the experiment with no payment. If you
have any questions, please raise your hand. The experimenter will come to you and answer your
questions individually.
Description of the Experiment
This experiment is fully computerized. After reading the instructions, before starting the
experimental task, you will have to answer to few control questions; these questions are going
to help you to understand the experimental task, and they have no effect on your final earnings.
The experiment is composed by 5 control questions (to help you understanding the experiment),
three phases (Phase I, Phase II and Phase III) and a final questionnaire. Each phase lasts 3 rounds
and in each round you can be a proposer or a responder. Your role will be randomly selected by the
computer with probability equal to 1/2 and communicated at the end of each round.
The proposer will be endowed with an initial amount of euros which can be shared with
a responder in the experiment. A responder will have no endowment and can accept or reject
the offer of the proposer.
Note: Your task in each round is to make choices that pertain your role as
a proposer and your role as a responder. Beware that you will have to take your decisions
before knowing if you will be a proposer or a responder.
Phase I
At the beginning of each round in Phase I, you will be selected either as O(dd) participant or
as an E(ven) participant with probability 1/2. If you are E your initial endowment is e22 and you
can allocate only even values. If you are O your initial endowment is e23 and you can allocate only
odd values. After that, you will be randomly paired with another participant, whose identity will not
be disclosed to you. If you are an O(dd) participant, you will be paired with an E(ven) participant;
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similarly, if you are an E(ven) participant, you will be paired with an O(dd) participant. The paired
participant will always be different from the one in the previous round.
Both you and your paired participant are asked to take the following decisions:
1. first, you have to decide, individually and independently, how much of your endowment
you to want to give to a responder (different from your paired participant) if you will be
selected as a proposer. If you are an O(dd) participant, you can choose one between these
numbers {1, 3, . . . , 21, 23}. If you are an E(ven) participant, you can choose one of the numbers
{0, 2, 4, . . . , 20, 22}.
Observe that both types of participants have the same number of possible choices, i.e., twelve, and that
the difference between the minimum and the maximum choice, i.e., 22e, is the same for both types
of participant.
2. Second, you have to decide, individually and independently, how much you want to update your
initial proposal if you will be selected as a proposer in the two following situations:
– the proposal of your paired participant is larger than yours; in this case you can either
confirm or increase your initial proposal;
– the proposal of your paired participant is smaller than your; in this case you can either
confirm or decrease your initial proposal.
Remember that in each of the two cases, your updated proposal can only be an odd number or even number
depending on whether you are an O or an E candidate.
Note: Beware that you will be asked to update your initial proposal before knowing if the other
has decided to propose more than you or less than you.
3. Third, you have to decide, individually and independently, what proposals you will accept if
you will be selected as a responder. In particular, you have to decide an acceptance threshold
such that all proposals larger than the threshold will be accepted and all proposals lower than the
threshold will be rejected.
Remember that the acceptance threshold can only be an odd number or even number depending on whether
you are an O or an E candidate.
After all participants have taken their decisions regarding the initial proposal, the updated
proposals and the acceptance threshold, the computer will
• adjust the proposals of each participant depending on whether the initial proposal of the paired
participant is larger or smaller than the own one;
• select, for each pair of participant, who is the proposer and who is the responder;
• randomly match each proposer with a responder from a different pair than the initial one and,
similarly, randomly match each responder with a proposer from a different pair than the initial one.
Observe that:
– O(dd) proposers will be matched with E(ven) receivers and that E(ven) proposers will be matched
with O(dd) receivers;
• the proposal communicated to the receiver will be the adjusted one (and not the initial one).
Your payoff in Phase I will be calculated as follows:
• if you are a proposer, your payoff will be equal to your endowment minus your offer both in case
the offer is above or below the responder’s acceptance threshold.
• if you are a receiver, your payoff will be equal to
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◦ the proposer’s proposal if this is larger than your acceptance threshold;
◦ equal to zero if the proposal is smaller than your acceptance threshold.
Summing up, at the end of each round the computer communicates:
– if you are proposer or responder;
– if your are a proposer, you will be communicated that you were selected as a proposer and you will
be informed about your final payoff and the payoff of the responder who received your proposal;
– if you are a receiver, you will be communicated that you were selected as a receiver and you will
be informed about your final payoff.
Note: The computer will not inform you about the initial proposal of the paired participant with whom you
interact at the beginning of each round.
Phase II
In Phase II, proposers are asked to take the same type of decision described in Phase I, therefore,
the same instructions apply in this case.
The decision that you have to take for the case in which you will be selected as receiver is different
in this Phase. In particular, in Phase II you have to state, individually and independently, if you want
to accept or refuse the proposal you will receive by selecting one of the two options Yes, No.
Remember that you have to state your decision without knowing the proposal you will receive.
Your payoff in each round of Phase II will be calculated as follows:
• if you are a proposer, your payoff is
◦ the initial endowment minus you proposal if the receiver selected the Yes option;
◦ zero if the receiver selected the No option;
• if you are a receiver, your payoff
◦ is the proposer’s proposal whether you accepted the offer;
◦ zero whether you refused the offer.
Summing up, at the end of each round the computer communicates:
– if you are proposer or responder;
– your final payoff.
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Phase III
In Phase III, proposers are asked to take the same type of decision described in Phase I and
Phase II, therefore, the same instructions apply in this case.
The decision that you have to take for the case in which you will be selected as receiver is different
in this Phase. In particular, in Phase III you have to state, individually and independently, what
proposals you will accept if you will be selected as a responder. In particular, you have to decide
an acceptance threshold such that all proposals larger than the threshold will be accepted and all
proposals lower than the threshold will be rejected.
Your payoff in Phase III will be calculated as follows:
• if you are a proposer, your payoff will be equal to
◦ your endowment minus your offer when your offer is above the responder’s
acceptance threshold;
◦ Zero, when you offer is below the responder’s acceptance threshold;
• if you are a receiver, your payoff will be equal to
◦ the proposer’s proposal if this is larger than your acceptance threshold;
◦ equal to zero if the proposal is smaller than your acceptance threshold.
Summing up, at the end of each round the computer communicates:
– if you are proposer or responder;
– your final payoff.
Your Final Earning for This Experiment
After completing the experiment, a lottery administrated by the computer will randomly select
one round to be considered for payment. Each round hs the same probability to be selected (1/9).
The result will be display it on your screen the corresponding payoff you made in that round.
Your total payoff from the experiment will be equal to the sum of:
– the payoff that you realised in the selected round;
– the participation fee of e3.
After having finished the experiment, but before receiving your payoff, you will be asked also to
fill up a short questionnaire about your demographics and other few questions. Please remain at your
cubicle until asked to come forward and receive payment for the experiment.
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Appendix B.
Figure A1. Independent offer and adjustments by game and treatment. Notes: Average values per
period are indicated by + for y+, • for y, and ◦ for y− while lines represent linear prediction plots
along with a confidence interval (CI 95%).
Table A1. Choice dynamic by Game (1)-controlling for single sessions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
UG YN IG UG YN IG UG YN IG
n n+ n−
L.Proposer 0.59 1.39 * 5.13 *** 0.38 1.50 * 6.37 *** 0.52 1.38 ** 4.51 ***
(0.39) (0.79) (1.48) (0.40) (0.84) (1.57) (0.33) (0.68) (1.32)
L.Profit −0.01 −0.13 ** −0.31 *** −0.03 −0.15 ** −0.40 *** −0.04 * −0.14 *** −0.30 ***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.09) (0.02) (0.05) (0.07)
Round 0.16 −0.09 −0.36 0.25 −0.16 −0.29 0.25 −0.38 −0.15
(0.26) (0.29) (0.28) (0.21) (0.27) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.32)
Odd −0.11 0.02 −0.94 0.13 −0.25 −1.34 ** −1.03 *** −0.39 −1.14 **
(0.41) (0.52) (0.60) (0.38) (0.54) (0.62) (0.32) (0.42) (0.50)
Treatment −2.54 *** −2.50 * −1.24 −1.97 ** −3.02 ** −1.45 −1.60 ** −0.91 0.11
(0.94) (1.40) (1.56) (0.93) (1.50) (1.80) (0.68) (1.09) (1.25)
Session 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Session 2 0.46 0.77 0.46 −0.18 1.39 0.76 −0.07 0.66 0.38
(0.84) (1.42) (1.45) (0.86) (1.39) (1.66) (0.72) (1.14) (1.14)
Session 3 0.34 −0.63 −0.77 0.66 −0.73 −0.93 −0.01 0.45 0.27
(0.88) (1.32) (1.43) (0.87) (1.42) (1.55) (0.59) (0.98) (1.07)
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Table A1. Cont.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
UG YN IG UG YN IG UG YN IG
n n+ n−
Session 4 0.65 1.25 0.98 0.90 0.79 1.24 0.67 1.49 1.07
(0.77) (1.16) (1.29) (0.77) (1.27) (1.36) (0.51) (0.97) (1.00)
Session 5 1.89 * 1.38 0.89 1.35 1.67 1.66 0.66 −0.03 0.12
(0.97) (1.61) (1.65) (1.04) (1.61) (1.82) (0.73) (1.18) (1.23)
Session 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Cons 6.32 *** 6.37 *** 5.13 ** 6.72 *** 8.58 *** 6.51 ** 4.28 *** 3.44 * 1.15
(1.53) (2.25) (2.37) (1.47) (2.42) (2.66) (1.14) (1.75) (2.06)
σ cons 3.22 *** 4.75 *** 4.76 *** 3.24 *** 4.87 *** 5.12 *** 2.53 *** 3.62 *** 3.60 ***
(0.19) (0.30) (0.35) (0.16) (0.28) (0.31) (0.15) (0.28) (0.31)
N 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288 288
LL −708.49 −652.48 −608.18 −736.86 −698.38 −666.38 −611.11 −529.90 −466.66
pseudo R2 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04
F 3.49 2.06 2.80 3.75 1.87 3.84 4.45 2.28 3.28
Notes: Tobit estimation with robust errors (clustered on individuals) censored at the lowest value (0).
The dependent variable is the twelve normalized offer levels ni , n+i , n
−
i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 11. ni =
yi−1
2 when i = o
and ni =
yi
2 when i = e n
+
i =
y+i −1
2 when i = o and ni =
y+i
2 when i = e ni =
y−i −1
2 when i = o and ni =
y−i
2
when i = e Covariates included in the regression are the lagged profit and role, the “odd” dummy to specify
whether the participant is asked to set an odd rather than an even offer, and the treatment. “Round” variable
refers to the three periods of each phase, but due to the lagged period analysis the variable accounts for the
effect of period 3. Session 6 is dropped for collinearity with Treatment variable.
* indicates pvalue<.1, ** pvalue<.05, *** pvalue<.01.
Table A2. Choice dynamic by Game (2)-controlling for single sessions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UG IG UG IG UG IG
n n+ n−
L.Proposer −1.30 * 4.63 ** −1.75 ** 5.68 ** −1.34 ** 2.81
(0.76) (2.25) (0.72) (2.46) (0.58) (1.85)
L.success −0.70 0.97 −0.41 1.52 −1.00 * 0.81
(0.67) (0.96) (0.72) (1.06) (0.57) (0.75)
L.success×L.Prop 2.97 *** 0.56 3.43 *** 0.77 2.83 *** 1.67
(0.93) (1.54) (0.87) (1.69) (0.70) (1.20)
L.Profit −0.07 −0.31 *** −0.12 *** −0.39 *** −0.08 ** −0.27 ***
(0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08)
Round 0.17 −0.31 0.26 −0.23 0.25 −0.07
(0.27) (0.29) (0.22) (0.28) (0.26) (0.34)
Treatment −2.56 *** −1.13 −1.99 ** −1.27 −1.62 ** 0.23
(0.91) (1.52) (0.89) (1.73) (0.63) (1.20)
Odd −0.19 −0.79 0.04 −1.12 * −1.11 *** −0.94 *
(0.41) (0.60) (0.37) (0.62) (0.31) (0.49)
Session 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Session 2 0.48 0.48 −0.16 0.79 −0.06 0.40
(0.81) (1.42) (0.83) (1.61) (0.68) (1.09)
Session 3 0.36 −0.53 0.74 −0.56 −0.02 0.57
(0.83) (1.42) (0.82) (1.54) (0.56) (1.06)
Session 4 0.66 0.96 0.94 1.19 0.66 1.02
(0.73) (1.28) (0.71) (1.33) (0.47) (0.97)
Session 5 1.94 ** 1.09 1.40 1.97 0.68 0.42
(0.95) (1.60) (1.01) (1.74) (0.68) (1.15)
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Table A2. Cont.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UG IG UG IG UG IG
n n+ n−
Session 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Cons 7.19 *** 4.11 * 7.55 *** 4.94 * 5.25 *** 0.06
(1.54) (2.45) (1.46) (2.62) (1.15) (2.09)
σ cons 3.16 *** 4.73 *** 3.15 *** 5.04 *** 2.46 *** 3.51 ***
(0.19) (0.35) (0.16) (0.31) (0.15) (0.30)
N 288 288 288 288 288 288
LL −708.49 −608.18 −736.86 −666.38 −611.11 −466.66
pseudo R2 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05
F 3.93 3.27 5.00 4.85 5.72 4.26
Notes: Tobit estimation with robust errors (clustered on individuals) censored at the lowest value (0).
The dependent variable is the twelve normalized offer levels ni , n+i , n
−
i = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..., 11. ni =
yi−1
2 when i = o
and ni =
yi
2 when i = e n
+
i =
y+i −1
2 when i = o and ni =
y+i
2 when i = e ni =
y−i −1
2 when i = o and ni =
y−i
2
when i = e Covariates included in the regression are the lagged profit, the lagged role and success (as well as
their interaction), “odd” dummy to specify whether the participant is asked to set an odd rather than an even
offer, and the treatment. “Round” variable refers to the three periods of each phase, but due to the lagged
period analysis the variable accounts for the effect of period 3.
* indicates pvalue<.1, ** pvalue<.05, *** pvalue<.01.
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